Iterated Belief Change and the Levi Identity by Nayak, Abhaya et al.
Iterated Belief Change and the Levi Identity
Abhaya Nayak1, Randy Goebel2, Mehmet Orgun1 and Tam Pham3
Abstract
Most works on iterated belief change have focussed on iterated belief re-
vision, namely, on how to compute (Kx)y . However, historically, belief
revision has been defined in terms of belief expansion and belief contrac-
tion that have been viewed as primary operations. Accordingly, what we
should be looking at are constructions like: (K+x )+y , (K−x )+y , (K+x )−y and
(K−x )−y . The first two constructions are relatively innocuous. The last two
are, however, more problematic. We look at these sequential operations.
In the process, we use the Levi Identity as the guiding principle behind
state changes (as opposed to belief set changes).
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1 Introduction
How new evidence impigns upon the knowledge of a rational agent has been
the subject of vigorous discussion in the last couple of decades. Alchourro´n,
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [2], who initiated discussion on this issue in the non-
probabilistic framework provided the basic formal foundation for this discus-
sion. Several variations and extensions of the basic framework have since been
investigated by different researchers in the area including belief update, mul-
tiple belief change, iterated belief change, and belief merging. The subject of
this paper is largely to do with the problem of iterated belief change.
Belief change has been viewed as any form of change in an agent’s beliefs.
Three forms of belief change have been investigated in the literature: expansion
– simple addition of new beliefs, even if it means the agent’s beliefs contradict
each other; contraction – removal of a belief from one’s belief corpus; and
revision – addition of new beliefs while ensuring that the resulting belief corpus
is consistent. The result of expanding, contracting or revising a belief corpus
K by a sentence x is respectively represented as the corpus K+x , K−x and Kx.
Properties of these operations are captured by well known rationality postulates,
and constructive approaches to these operators are available in the literature.
K+x is simply defined as Cn(K [ fxg) where Cn is the consequence operation
of the background logic. The connection between these operators is captured
by the famous Levi Identity: Kx = (K−:x)+x . So, belief revision can always be
taken to be a secondary notion constructed via the primitive operations of belief
expansion and belief contraction.
By “Iteratd Belief Change” we refer to the problem of dealing with sequen-
tial changes in belief. On the face of it, then, iterated belief change should deal
with how we can construct the corpus (K2x )y given belief corpus K, sentences
x and y and belief change operations 2 and . Literature in the area have largely
dealt with iterated belief revision: constructing (Kx)y. Given the Levi Identity,
it would appear that we could do away with revision, in favour of expansion
and contraction. If so, then what we should be discussing instead are construc-
tion of corpora such as (K+x )+y ,(K−x )+y , (K+x )−y and (K−x )−y . The first two of
these construction, where the second operation is expansion, are unproblematic
(given a contraction operation), since expansion is a very simple operation. It
is the last two of these constructs that pose rather difficult problems. The aim
of this paper is to address these two forms of iterated belief change.
Let us look at these problems in some what more detail. Expansion oper-
ation is not state sensitive – K+x is completely determined by K and x. But
contraction operation is. The set K−x is not fully determined by K and x: de-
pending on what belief state K is associated with, the value of K−x would be
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different. In particular, belief contraction inherently involves a choice among
multiple candidate beliefs for removal, and the preference information that de-
termines this choice is in the belief state but is extraneous to the belief set K.
Assume that a belief set K, two sentences x and y, and an appropriate con-
traction operation − are given. Since + is not state sensitive, (K+x )+y is simply
Cn(K [ fx; yg). Similarly, (K−x )+y is simply Cn(K−x [ fyg), which is easily
determined given that we know how the contraction operation − behaves. But
since − is state sensitive, the construction of (K+x )−y and of (K−x )−y can not
be subjected to such simple treatment. Assuming that K is different from K+x
(respectively K−x ), they are part of different belief states, and hence the con-
traction operation appropriate for removing beliefs from K is not appropriate
for removing beliefs from K+x ( respectively from K−x ). This paper is therefore
primarily about characterising the belief sets (K+x )−y and of (K−x )−y .
In previous works [6] we have argued that the belief revision operation 
itself may be taken to represent the belief state, with the attendant view that
alongwith changes in belief, the belief revision operation  also changes. It
has been argued that [] this change in the operation can be conveniently hidden
under simple notation:  denotes the primoddial belief state, and (i) for input
sequence (i) denotes the belief set that results from the input sequence (i). If
so, then the contraction operation − can as well be taken to be an alternative
representation of the belief state. There is some asymmetry between the rep-
resentation of a state by a revision operation  and a contraction operation −
however. In the former case, since we are interested in revision, given initial
state , subsequent states can be represented simply by (i) where (i) is the in-
put sequence. But in the latter case an input sequence itself does not specify the
required change to the initial state −. For instance, to take a simple case, given
some input sentence x, we cannot tell what state −(x) really refers to since the
sentence x could be an argument for contraction or expansion!
Although classical belief change accounts (such as AGM [1, 2]) provide a
systematic way to deal with belief change, they are designed for dealing with
one-shot belief change rather than iterated belief change. While providing a
cogent account of how a rational agent should change his/her beliefs in light
of a piece of evidence, they fail to give a systematic account for belief change
as an iterative process of how an epistemic agent should deal with a sequence
of evidence. A dynamic approach to iterated belief revision has been proposed
by Nayak, et.al [6] to resolve this problem. The purpose of this paper is to
complement this dynamic approach by supplying it with the iterated expansion
and contraction operations.
In Section 1, we briefly discuss the AGM Framework, its problems and how
others have attempted to resolve the problem and then we review the dynamic
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approach proposed in [6] which provides an iterative account to deal with be-
lief revision. The paper will then complement this approach by the dynamic
expansion and contraction operators. Section 2 begins with the analogues of
the Levi identity which establishes the relationship between the three belief
change operators: revision, contraction and expansion. The dynamic expansion
operator will be introduced briefly next, followed by a sematic approach to the
construction of a dynamic contraction operator. Section 3 provides a partial
syntatic account for this dynamic contraction operator. Finally, we conclude
with a brief summary and discussion.
2 Background
The theory of belief change purports to model how a current theory or body
of beliefs, K, can be rationally modified in order to accommodate a new ob-
servation x. A piece of observation, such as x is represented as a sentence in a
propositional language L, and a theory, such as K, is assumed to be a set of sen-
tenecs in L, closed under a supraclassical consequence operation, Cn. Since the
new piece of information x may contravene some current beliefs in K, chances
are, some beliefs in K will be discarded before x is eased into it. Accordingly,
three forms be belief change are recognised in the belief change framework:
1. CONTRACTION: K−x is the result of discarding some unwanted informa-
tion x from the theory K
2. EXPANSION: K+x is the result of simple-mindedly incorporating some
information x into the theory K
3. REVISION: Kx is the result of incorporating some information x into the
theory K in a manner so as to avoid internal contradiction in Kx.
The intuitive connection among these operators is captured by the following
two identities named, respectively, after Isaac Levi and William Harper:
1. LEVI IDENTITY: Kx = (K−:x)+x
2. HARPER IDENTITY: K−x = K:x \K.
There is another, third, identity that, though well known, has not merited special
nomenclature:
1. THIRD IDENTITY:
K+x =
{
Kx if :x =2 K
K? otherwise
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The three belief change operations are traditionally introduced with three
sets of rationality postulates. These postulates, along with motivation and in-
terpretation for them, may be found in [1]. The expansion operation is very
easily constructed:
 K+x = Cn(K [ fxg)
Contraction and Revision operations are relatively more sophisticated opera-
tions since they deal with choice. The three identities mentioned above show
that the three operations are to a large extent inter-definable. However, right
from the start, the contraction and expansion operations have been taken to be
more fundamental operations than the revision operation, and accordingly, the
Levi Identity has typically been used to define revision.
The AGM postulates deal with “one-shot” belief change. The only inter-
esting inference about iterated belief revision that can be drawn from the AGM
postulates is the following AGM-It (Nayak et.al, 2003, p. 4)
(AGM-It): If :y =2 Kx then (Kx)y = Kx^y
that places no constraints on iterated belief change when :y 2 Kx. Consider
the following problem (Darwiche & Pearl, 1997 [4]). We learnt from indepen-
dent sources that X is smart and and that X is rich. In other words, we would
retain the belief that X is rich even if X is found not to be smart and vice versa.
Imagine that we first obtained some information to the effect that X is not smart,
so we still retain our belief that X is rich. But then, we receive another piece of
evidence confirming that X is smart after all. Should we, or should we not, now
believe that X is rich? Intuitively, we should continue to believe that X is rich,
since the two (sequential) pieces of evidence have no bearing upon whether or
not X is rich. However, surprisingly, as the AGM-It does not handle the case
:smart 2 K:smart, the AGM system would allow us to believe that X is smart
and not rich!
To alleviate this situation, several proposals have been advanced. Here we
revisit the proposal by Nayak, et.al [6], namely, that the revision operation 
is best viewed as a dynamic operator, an operator that evolves as new pieces
of information are accepted. Accordingly, the AGM framework is extended as
follows:
(0) (K?)x = Cn(fxg) for any sentence x (Absurdity)
(1-6) As in the AGM
(7new) If x ^ y 6‘ ? then (Kx)jxy = Kx^y (Conjunction)
(8new) If x ^ y ‘ ? but 6‘ :x then (Kx)jxy = Ky (DP20)
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The last two postulates may be viewed as constraints on j rather than on , and
in fact jointly defining the meta-revision operation j itself.
It has been argued ([6]) that this dynamic revision operator, representing a
belief state, is best viewed as a unary operation, say initially 0. When a piece
of evidence ei (for i > 0) is received, the then current belief state i−1 gets
updated to the new belief state i as follows: i = i−1jei. A revision step
is carried out in two sub-steps. Given current belief set Ki−1 = i−1(>) and
evidence ei,
Ki := K
i−1
eii := i−1jei
This belief (dynamic) revision operation is given a semantic characterisation
in terms of an evolving plausibility ordering over the interpretations generated
by the background language.
Definition 1 Let Ω be the set of possible worlds (interpretations) of the back-
ground languageL andv a total preorder (a connected, transitive and reflexive
relation) over Ω. For any set   Ω and world ! we will say ! is a v-minimal
member of  if and only if both ! 2  and ! v !0 for all !0 2 .
By !1 v !2 we will understand that !2 is not more plausible than !1. The
expression !1  !2 will be used as a shorthand for (!1 v !2 and !2 v !1).
The symbol < will denote the strict part of v. For any set S  L we will
denote by [S] the set f! 2 Ω j ! j= s for every s 2 S g. For readability, we will
abbreviate [fsg] by [s]. Intuitively, the preordervwill be the semantic analogue
of the revision operation , and represents the belief states of an agent. We will
say that Kv is the belief set associated with the preorder v. It is defined as the
set of sentences satisfied by the v-minimal worlds, i.e.
Kv = fx 2 L j ! j= x for all v -minimal ! 2 Ωg
An inconsistent belief state is represented by an empty relation v?: for every
pair !; !0 2 Ω; ! 6v? !0.
A modified Grove-Construction [?] is used to construct the revision opera-
tion from a given plausibility relation:
Definition 2 (v to *)
x 2 Kve iff
{
[e]  [x] if v=v?
! j= x for every ! v -minimal in [e] otherwise.
The plausibility ordering is stipulated to evolve as follows. TWO SPECIAL
CASES:
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1. If [e] = ; then, and only then, ve=v?
2. Else, if v=v?, then !1 ve !2 iff either !1 j= e or !2 j= :e.
GENERAL CASE:
When the prior preorder is nonempty (v6=v?) and the evidence is satisfi-
able ([e] 6= ;),
1. If !1 j= e and !2 j= e then !1 ve !2 iff !1 v !2
2. If !1 j= :e and !2 j= :e then !1 ve !2 iff !1 v !2
3. If !1 j= e and !2 j= :e then !1 <e !2
2.1 Need for a Dynamic Contraction Operator
Just as there is a need for itareted belief revision, there is a prima facia case for
iterated belief expansion and iterated belief contraction. The former is trivial:
(K+x )
+
y = Cn(Cn(K [ fxg) [ fyg) = Cn(K [ fx; yg). Iterated Belief Con-
traction, however, does not soccumb to such easy solution. Just like revision,
contraction involves choice; hence iterated belief contraction would presuppose
an account of contracting from a choice mechanism. It is little curprise that the
rationality postulates of belief contraction offered by the AGM does notprovide
a cogent account of iterated belief contraction:
Closure: K−x is a theory
Inclusion: K−x  K (inclusion)
Vacuity: If x 62 Cn(K) then K−x = K
Success: If ; 6‘ x then x =2 Cn(K−x )
Preservation: If Cn(x) = Cn(y) then K−x = K−y
Recovery: K  Cn((K−x ) [ fxg)
Intersection: (K−x ) \ (K−y )  K−x^y
Conjunction: If x =2 K−x^y then K−(x^y)  K−x
Interestingly, there is very little discussion in the literature regarding iter-
ated belief contraction – an exception being [5]. Presumably the reason behind
such reluctance is the fact that, in some sense or other, belief revision and belief
expansion are “natural” operations where as belief contraction is a “theoretical
construct”. Despite the persuasion of literary critics to view the willing suspen-
sion of disbelief as a constituting ingredient of poetic faith1, in the belief change
literature, belief contraction remains a second class citizen. However, even if
1Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Biographia Literaria.
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belief contraction is not as natural as other forms of belief change, iterated be-
lief contraction deserves the researchers’ attention – if not for anything else, for
the sake of completeness. As we see below, there are more compelling reasons
to study iterated belief contraction.
2.2 Argument from the Levi Identity
As mentioned before, Levi Identity Kx = (K−:x)+x has generally been used to
define the revision operation via the expansion and contraction operation, the
latter two being viewed to be more basic. This fact has been however largely ig-
nored in the belief revision literature. In particular, The computation of (Kx)y
has been carried out directly by providing an account of how a belief state
evolves in light of newly accepted information, instead of decomposing the
expression (Kx)y into (((K−:x)+x )−:y)+y . The primacy of + and − over  how-
ever manadtes that we provide an account of how the belief set (((K−:x)+x )−:y)+y
should be computed. It follows then that we should in general be asking out-
selves how to compute sets such as
1. (K+x )+y
2. (K−x )+y
3. (K+x )−y , and
4. (K−x )−y .
Out of these, the first two constructs, the second operation in them being
an expansion operation, are relatively innocuous. The last two constructs, how-
ever, deserve more careful attention: since the second operation is a contraction
operation, it will be dependent on the intermediate epistemic state that would
have evolved from the initial epistemic state associated with K. Notice that the
last construct is exactly the problem of iterated belief contraction.
We need a reasoned account of iterated belief change (expansion and con-
traction) in which the second operation is a contraction operation. Such an
account can be provided by providing an account of how an epistemic state gets
modified when subjected to expansion or contraction by a sentence. The aim of
the next section is to explore this issue.
3 Approach
Given a contraction function, we can construct a revision function by first con-
tracting everything in the belief set that would cause the addition of x to lead to
8
inconsistency and then expanding the belief set by x. That is the intuition be-
hind the Levi Identity. It is the Levi Identity that embodies the idea that revision
is reducible to contraction and expansion – the idea that forces us to examine
different combinations of contraction and expansion, different forms of belief
change. However, the Levi Identity, as traditionally conceived, involves mod-
ification of a belief set, where as iterated belief revision (and dynamic belief
revision) involves revision of the preorder over possible worlds: vx is taken to
be the resultant preorder, when the given preorder v is revised in light of an
accepted input sentence x. It is therefore desirable to obtain an analogue of the
Levi Identity:
NEW LEVI IDENTOTY vx= (v	:x)x
where 	 is a preorder contraction operation, and  is a preorder
expansion operator.
Therefore, our aim now is to define these two new operatorsv	x andvx similar
to vx in such a way that this analogy is preserved. Once this aim is achieved, it
will be sufficient to characterise any belief change by using only the contraction
and expansion preorders.
3.1 Preorder Expansion – semantics
Belief expansion is the simplest form of belief change. In the AGM account,
belief expansion is captured by: K+x = Cn(K [ fxg). Semantically speak-
ing, [K+x ] = [K] \ [x]: the result of accepting information x results in a state
that entertains exactly those worlds that satisfy all the old beliefs as well as the
accepted piece of information. It follows that expansion does not handle incon-
sistency very well – if the new piece of information conflicts with the current
beliefs, the agent ends up believing anything and everything.
As mentioned in section 2, expansion can be defined in terms of belief re-
vision (the “Third Identity”). This motivates the way we define the expansion
preorder as follows:
vx =
{ vx if :x =2 K
v? otherwise
In other words, if there exists a world ! 2 [x] such that ! is v-minimal,
then the belief would be the same whether we expand it by x or revise it by x.
However, if the current belief does not allow any world ! which is consistent to
[x], then its expansion to include x will result in an inconsistent state.
With this definition of the dynamic expansion operator, we are now in the
position to construct the dynamic contraction operator.
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3.2 Contraction Operations Satisfying the New Levi Identity
The use of a system of nested spheres of worlds to visually represent the pre-
order v is wellknown [3]: a world more central in the system represents a more
plausible world than one relatively less central. A sphere is a set of possible
worlds for a given belief set and a system of spheres is a set of nested spheres
which can be considered as an ordering of plausibility over the worlds; the
more plausible worlds lying closer to the centre of the system of spheres. The
smallest sphere at the centre of the system represents the current beliefs in the
sense that it consists of exactly the worlds that satisfy the current beliefs. Two
boundary cases of such representation of a belief state are:
1. FULL PREORDER. If ! v !0 for all worlds ! and !0, the system of
sphere is conflated to a single sphere. It represents the state of complete
epistemic innocence – the agent in question holds no contingent beliefs
whatsoever. It is the state of null information v>: the associated belief
set is Cn(;).
2. EMPTY PREORDER. If ! v !0 for no two worlds ! and !0, the state
in question represents the “epistemic hell”, a state in which the agent
believes every conceivable state of affairs. This is the state of full infor-
mation v?: the associated belief set is K? = Cn(?).
In order to contract from the state of null information, nothing needs to be
done. So,
(v>)	x =v> for all x.
However, contracting from the state of full information is not so obvious. To
contract K? by x, we need to allow some world which is consistent to :x
to be included in the resultant belief state. So it is reasonable to suggest that
(K?)−x = Cn(f:xg). However, in this case, the agent will end up believing
:x but this should not be allowed as there is no evidence to support either x or
:x. Therefore, it is more appropriate that the agent will lose all the information
and start his/her epistemic life again when he/she reaches this state (K?)−x =
Cn(;). Accordingly we postulate that
(v?)	x =v> for all x.
Now let us look at how state contraction should function in the principal
case. Conside the initial state v be represented by a sustem of spheres [K0] 
[K1]  [K2]  [K3] where, as illustrated in Figure 1, [K0] = 1, [K1] =
[K0] [ 2 [ 5, [K2] = [K1] [ 3 [ 6 and [K3] = [K2] [ 4 [ 7. We are interested
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in contracting this state by the belief x, where [:x] = 5 [ 6 [ 7. In order to
satisfy the original Levi Identity, it will suffice if the state resulting from this
contraction centers on [K0] [ 5, since that would ensure that if K0 was to be
revised by :x, the resulting theory will hold of exactly those worlds that are
minimal in [:x], that is, 5. This effectively is the relevant faithfulness condition
for belief contraction.
1,5
2
3,6
4,7
1,5
2,6
3,7 4
1,5
4
1,5
6
7
3 4
Na
tu
ra
l
State Before Contraction
Lexicographic
1 2 3
4
6
5
7 [ x]¬
Alternating
P
riority
2
2
6
7
3
Figure 1: States before and after the contraction
The new Levi Identity imposes one more constraint on this. It effectively
says that, the resultant state after the contraction, apart from having [K0] as
the center, must ensure that the prior ordering of worlds inside [x] (respectively
outside [x]) should not be disturbed. That is, for any two worlds ! and !0 that
are both inside [x] (or both inside [:x]), ! v	x !0 iff ! v !0. This condition is
quite appealing, and is reminiscent of conditions well known in the context of
iterated belief revision (Spohn’s OCF’s, Darwiche & Pearl’s account, as well as
Nayak’s Lexicographic Revision respect this condition). It turns out that in the
current context, the new Livi Identity is liberal enough to allow many different
construction of the state contraction operation 	. In Figure 1 we illustrate four
such constructions, each of which looks reasonable, and satisfies the new Levi
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Identity.
1. NATURAL CONTRACTION: The only modification in the starting state
effected is due to the faithfulness requirement. All other worlds are left
as before.
2. LEXICOGRAPHIC CONTRACTION: Faithfulness puts [K0] and the worlds
in 5 at the same footing. All other worlds are “shifted” accordingly, thus
for instance, worlds in 2 and in 6 are viewed to be at par with each other.
3. ALTERNATING CONTRACTION: Faithfulness is respected. Then, repeat-
edly, the next best worlds in [x] and [:x] are alternated, with [:x] being
given priority.
4. PRIORITY CONTRACTION: All worlds in [:x] are given more priority
than all worlds in [x], subject to the satisfaction of Faithfulness. Faithful-
ness is respected.
It is easily noticed that all these four constructions of a state contraction
operation will satisfy the New Levi Identity. Hence, if we must identify a unique
state contraction operation, further reasonable principles must be identified and
adhered to. We find such a principle in the generalisation of the Harper Identity,
as discussed below.
3.3 New Harper Identity
In the context of classical belief change, the Levi Identity is equivalent to the
Harper Identity; K−x = K \ K:x. Semantically the Harper Identity says that
the v-minimal worlds in Ω and the v-minimal worlds in [:x] are to be given
equivalent status in the state resulting from the contraction of v by x. This
Identity is easily generalised as follows:
Let Bi; 0  i  n − 1 be the n bands (v-equivalence classes) of
worlds generated by the the pre-contraction statev, where B0 con-
sists of the v-minimal worlds in Ω and each ! 2 Bi < each !0 2
Bj for every i < j. Let k be the smallest index such that Bk \
[:x] 6= ;. Define Ci = Bk+i \ [:x] for 0  i  n− k, and Ci = ;
for n−k+1  i  n. The bands inv	x are given by Di = Bi[Ci,
for 0  i  n− 1.
It is easily verified that the new Harper Identity subsumes the new Levi
Identity. Furthermore, Lexicographic contraction is the only state contraction
operation described above that satisfies the new Harper Identity.
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3.4 Test Case
We have noticed that the new Levi Identity and the new Harper Identity argue
in favour of adopting Lexicographic Contraction as the correct state contraction
operation. In this section we examine a test case to see how this operation fares
vis a vis our intuitive judgment about iterated contraction. We consider a variant
of a well known example due to Darwiche and Pearl [4]:
We initially believe on independent grounds that x is smart and that x
is rich. That is, removing smart leaves rich undisturbed, and similarly,
removing rich leaves smart undisturbed. The question is, what should we
believe if we were to first remove smart followed by removal of rich. That
is, what should be K	smart)	rich? Intuitively, the resultant belief set should have
nothing interesting to say about smart and rich.
Figure 2 below illustrates this scenario.
~Smart,~Rich: 00
~Smart,Rich:    01
Smart,~Rich:    10
Smart,Rich:      11
01,11
00
10
01,11
00
10Priority
Na
tur
al
A
lte
rn
ati
ng
Lexicographic
01,11
00
10
01,11
10,00
00
01,10,11
10,01,11,00
10
01,11,00
10
01,11,00
Figure 2: A variant of Smart-Rich problem
It is easily verified that the result of using Lexicigraphic Contraction in this
case of iterated belief contraction concurs with our intuitive expectation. In
contrast, the other operations leave residual beliefs – the Natural Contraction
allows the agent to retain the belief smart _ rich, while both Priority and
Alternating retain smart ! rich.
Thus, this test case adds further credence to Lexicographic Contraction.
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4 Partial Characterisation
In this section we provide some technical results that partially characterise the
Lexicographic contraction operation. Before the results are pesented, we pro-
vide a rigorous definition of this operation. The preorder operation v	e based
on the total preorder v and the sentence x to be removed with the following
constraints:
Condition 1: If !; !0 2 [x] then ! v	x !0 if and only if ! v !0
Condition 2: If !; !0 2 [:x] then ! v	x !0 if and only if ! v !0
Condition 3: If ! 2 [x]; !0 2 [:x] then ! v	x !0 if and only if
for every chain !00 < !01 <    < !0 in [:x] of length n,
there exists a chain !0 < !1 <    < ! in [x] of length n
Condition 4: If ! 2 [:x]; !0 2 [x] then ! v	x !0 if and only if
for every chain !00 < !01 <    < !0 in [x] of length n
there exists a chain !0 < !1 <    < ! in [:x] of length n
Here we simply list some of the important properties of 	. The complete
characterisation and proof of the properties will be provided in the complete
paper.
1. (K−x )−y = K−y only if K−y  K−x .
This property shows that in the iterated contraction (K−x )−y , the effect of
the first contraction is washed away by the second contraction only if
K−y  K−x . This is understandable since removal of y removes more
information then removal of x.
2. (K−x )−y = K−x if and only if either j= y or y =2 K−x
This property shows that in the iterated contraction (K−x )−y , the second
contraction will have no effect if and only if either y is a tautology or y
does not exist in the belief set after the first contraction.
3. If y ‘ x then (K−x )−y = K−x_y
4. If x ‘ y and y =2 K−x then (K−x )−y = K−x^y
5. If x 2 K−y and y 2 K−x then (K−x )−y = K−x \K−y
6. If x ‘ y and y 2 K−x then (K−x )−y = K−x \K−y .
Properties 5 and 6 concern scenarios in which (K−x )−y = K−x \ K−y . In
these cases, the order of the contractions is not important as the resultant
belief set after the two contractions is always the intersection of the two
belief sets after each individual contraction. The set of worlds in the
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resultant belief sets is the union of the current worlds K and the minimal
world of [:x] and the minimal world of [:y].
7. If x =2 K−y , y 2 K−x and x 6‘ y then (K−x )−y = K−x \K−x_y.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we started with the idea of using the expansion and contraction op-
eration instead of the revision operation, in the context of iterated belief change.
This was motivated by the Levi Identity. We noticed that it naturally led to the
problem of iterated contraction.
In the process we defined state expansion and state contraction operations.
For this purpose we used an analogue of the Levi Identity appropriate for state
transformations. It turned out that this analogue is not strong enough to deter-
mine a unique state contraction operation. We then argued that an analogue of
the Harper Identity leads to a reasoned account of state contraction, which nat-
urally corresponds to the idea behind lexicographic Revision. An examination
of a test case lends further support to such a state contraction operation.
We have provided a partial characterisation of this operation. Complete
characterisation of this operation, as well as its generalisation to complement
belief merging will be taken up in our future works.
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